Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 100d5b5735e632a2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

19.3 KB Created: 2017-01-24 14:48:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2021-06-20
MD5: f05e657ceea0fb4586927fcad48cab91 SHA-1: 8490ea6d19be53b3791c5844f74c64c22dc514cf SHA-256: 100d5b5735e632a2b3735d371c09aeed93412e2c40bc538ec2069f7c42af9742
124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1127.001 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: Microsoft Office

The sample is a malicious Office document containing an embedded OLE object. This object is identified as an Ole10Native package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically a JavaScript file. The embedded URL http://ab.merlhumphreyphotography.com/stat.php?a=1&tag=js03&h= is likely used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The document body's instruction to 'Double click the icon to open the document' suggests a user execution vector.

Heuristics 5

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ab.merlhumphreyphotography.com/stat.php?a=1&tag=js03&h= In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 5632 bytes
SHA-256: 09027a1c8bd2645790ced77a548c8bb798f71b8b9d3bdd140377a59b9e1eeb7b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Echo(msg);}}
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 2800 bytes
SHA-256: 07126ad7673375f491d7ffd97f2187deab7ae5c9c3a77ec68482bb68a1491336
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Echo(msg);}}
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 5232 bytes
SHA-256: ec71951d57aa660cf767640d7194f1a5d0e2ab3138b31d017b29edf309956f5b