RTF malware analysis — malicious · 0ff8b68f49383b71

MALICIOUS

RTF

108.4 KB First seen: 2024-07-20

MD5: 5dc44b9ca9e7ce8958b2b6f36cc06ebd SHA-1: 695464e5829793e857b494fb503c8ab7b341d9e2 SHA-256: 0ff8b68f49383b71e5fb908c161d32cde70e379e71ad370bafd8ea2c5542f5e0

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The heuristics indicate that the OLE object is automatically linked and updated, suggesting it's designed to trigger an exploit upon opening. This exploit likely leads to the download and execution of a secondary payload, characteristic of a phishing or exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001862.bin` `307848bdd2ef92824de949e2a1c91a3e96db2566e877abebf4700b1b92409559`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1862	2074 bytes

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