RTF malware analysis — malicious · 0ff105df6495ddf6

MALICIOUS

RTF

97.5 KB First seen: 2024-07-23

MD5: adfee8b962087fe5108f615806ce6903 SHA-1: 9fe53ce6caac64baf06bd05185898c6ea13e7b9f SHA-256: 0ff105df6495ddf66c6517261123c11119d2ad4433df36f9414106a7af3fe411

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics indicates that the file is designed to exploit this vulnerability upon opening, likely to download and execute a secondary payload. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear user-facing content, reinforcing the malicious intent.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000b34.bin` `36857b3349239410028a0eb86111e393fae5e4311cd26d882d7f81ca55674594`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xB34	2083 bytes

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