Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0feb652475412564…

MALICIOUS

PDF

54.1 KB Created: 2020-07-23 13:42:32 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 7e185634875589d949e6f5a2a8169f0d SHA-1: 709526c505573005617a9a80395d4b2120d9b278 SHA-256: 0feb65247541256494c079a666802fb09cd89577125be13c118ae16c743871fd
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a malicious redirector link disguised as an app download, aiming to lead users to malicious infrastructure. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, and heuristics indicate it's part of a link farm designed for SEO manipulation, likely to host further malicious content. The presence of a download button lure and password archive lure suggests a multi-stage attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=camscanner+android+app
    • http://files.prevertere.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872032/177ec0afd52.pdf
    • http://files.jillpaddockart.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438228/joditibiwavasibuv.pdf
    • http://files.approachapparel.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383664/8009279.pdf
    • http://files.lightningridgerealestate.com.au/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815961/tuwor.pdf
    • http://files.metamorphosskincare.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438180/3311552.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/8620/8406/files/resufinafubofijegirok.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/5321/2060/files/nuxajumesamojaw.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/9345/8070/files/33609793874.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/4027/6642/files/nakarobawobod.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/1306/3327/files/30299638423.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/2887/9272/files/denila.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0157/6604/files/rawalotodilaz.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/6890/6906/files/digekofazad.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3179/7668/files/vezevi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/9654/7230/files/tisixonanodupuvaziriboda.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4479/7600/files/42683679363.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/3797/4950/files/fezubupisalowuz.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9164/8929/files/90788413388.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007a99.bin
d36df23a13bd7a3bbfcae770a289d9de8528d131ad1e93982c5e534dac66e1e3		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7A99 4628 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008ae2.bin
9f92c9974b2212489d9d6a5eb0457f596340d58f3ca19a4c7c60e222b33e3597		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8AE2 4920 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00009b6e.bin
4fd6e28e108499e0b5e156d112a081a4e6a5326c30c867458ef1563007a8c51e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9B6E 17816 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.