Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0fe245f891c97e53…

MALICIOUS

PDF

36.7 KB Created: 2020-09-02 17:10:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: dfc344ba61162550866b3d243f91d1f3 SHA-1: e360fbe6f29ce5c120996c4897b6aa728e8f20fd SHA-256: 0fe245f891c97e5322c5815217df667119517b4591c6994a5732416f965e4261
152 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, with one identified as a malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains references to 'bootstrap 4 datetimepicker' and the wkhtmltopdf application, suggesting it might be a lure for users seeking specific software or information. The presence of numerous external PDF links points towards a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic, potentially leading to malicious content or phishing sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9970

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=bootstrap+4+datetimepicker
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6454/0840/files/wekizakidizeximeginofafeg.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/7865/4883/files/xepunonegejofibepox.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/6611/2662/files/70564008346.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/9954/4984/files/zumologukadijuze.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/760101_2253b1d5bf7141fdb77d54b0749835e6.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/f8de3e_2ffe7f4ea7c844ff8c6a3ca0b44b4280.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/7dd30d_c53c076d509d4f8f9189c64512fca725.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/79e0dc_80de92d965914f2ab757e7a5a249f6b1.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/238140_507c50a43fdf42d696b9cf17b98b8548.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a43ec6_aa2d1d33ed8f44c1a7708825233c70ad.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_51e65490c53b4a0c88aa030be9b7a340.pdf
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004e80.bin
ee0f3abb9caebcdbf578b1d13b90ac92cd37a6cdfbd3d8d3468d9cd6563c04a6
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4E80 5388 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000060c8.bin
ed9b8858aaa2f9089d8223127963489f2a39aa300d6f213423cff05f07d63336
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x60C8 14704 bytes