Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0fdd3556e6dbe752…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.5 KB First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: 84fa4a47996a8c585ec3aa45374e96d3 SHA-1: 74c69553246634fcbcc2ccce5698d0b2835c85eb SHA-256: 0fdd3556e6dbe752c01971b1c5a1049754549eb7d977a139363958c4874f5353
200 Risk Score

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000db.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xDB 1574 bytes
SHA-256: 08dbcb2216444a62499bd9ff3df337f3d5a3e0225066790473d593b1fb90d39f