Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0fcec7242f4b4ca6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.8 KB Created: 2021-09-13 05:22:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: b82b021f0f90b7bc71cf87c87229064a SHA-1: ea61e7cad81989e34be6b00169715630a585e6e3 SHA-256: 0fcec7242f4b4ca65b0b21e75496e1b9f62daa425794ea8a2397a0cb2f2b47c1
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1534 Internal Spearphishing

This PDF document is identified as malicious by multiple heuristics, including ML classification and ClamAV detection. It impersonates iCloud to lure users into clicking a link that leads to credential phishing. The document also contains a link farm pointing to compromised WordPress uploads and disposable hosting, suggesting it is part of a broader phishing infrastructure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9981

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+transfer+messages+from+android+to+iphone+manually.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ikomsolutions.com/admin/userfiles/file/buvafuwo.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://begues.mobi/userfiles/file/8586659782.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ailani.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3491663f68bc34a23f3654aac2d9a773/49544144316.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://colegiumaniucarei.ro/ckfinder/userfiles/files/valarelagelosipikepom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dazzlin.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8f2343a9ccd43d2a292587233692a3d5/misefuvetekefowibujoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sardavetri.it/userfiles/file/senuzowagura.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stellarp.com/userfiles/file/mafukesesawofaxozarogeki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jeykrishnaclub.com/images/file/vabebowikilav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hantverkarenisandby.se/UserFiles/files/dekifosep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tabletopad.com/images/file/13986620987.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rlponder.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/dowilawividuboxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://abhimaninteriors.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/48861488907.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://takipbizde.com/calisma2/files/uploads/4249035008.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://baanpowertrain.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161396ab347a01---74934932770.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ajambary.com/userfiles/file/99888376948.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://himalayakebab.irafbrothers.com/shipinc/userfiles/files/tukidabujozegisili.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://limsurempat.com/contents/files/20281102167.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bidadapatidar.com/userfiles/file/86027424764.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cuadepthanglong.com/images/ckeditor/files/35174015975.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mamitobe.ru/files/file/26279308997.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bearings-home.com/userfiles/file/90681178187.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://heart-calligraphy.com/uploads/files/202109120248296248.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+transfer+messages+from+android+to+iphone+manuallyPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000db1a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDB1A 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000f32c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF32C 18612 bytes
SHA-256: 4cc0ff8d788e3099b1abf6e63931ee4c3e62ad980ccb19fd819d17135ec3ed84
font_02_sfnt_off00012306.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12306 11236 bytes
SHA-256: 094fb6bd4aec0ee6ad8082ae407e291e3cad17639cbcd2fea24ddd9bb1772d89

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