RTF malware analysis — malicious · 0fc03c36db0ed1bd

MALICIOUS

RTF

178.9 KB First seen: 2024-06-26

MD5: 681f318b1d7a8a9505e6b3ec626a8988 SHA-1: 4c35ab24e36b1e0012b6eeb46a6304c7ee422209 SHA-256: 0fc03c36db0ed1bdc097436804a46cf5a3ff667ce77291ffa637c0ec506fe552

200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the CVE-2017-11882 Equation Editor vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to execute arbitrary code or download additional malicious content. The presence of `Ole10Native` stream and ` tfobjautlink` heuristic firings strongly indicate exploitation of this known vulnerability. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with exploit-laced documents.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE

RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM

RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001f7f.bin` `714526a3be23bca6e1d890cd9cc7e5690008ed58cc822477543152aed6f53598`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1F7F	4172 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.