Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0fb441afce82ed13…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.8 KB Created: 2021-07-27 17:32:08 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 1269d5371936789e1f7be6df333dfa24 SHA-1: 6d57a14d73d030a523ba5d77984a49afcd7d2024 SHA-256: 0fb441afce82ed13b443cd0c33ba3d953ab24c07310341ccfd44cd3928839422
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

This PDF file exhibits multiple indicators of malicious intent, including links to algorithmically generated URLs and compromised CMS upload storage. The presence of a visual download button suggests a lure to trick users into downloading a secondary payload. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate this PDF is a phishing or trojan delivery mechanism.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9977

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ticketsperiodico.com/galeria/files/fanaxugunejolupifiz.pdf
    • https://dedywiredja.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b422e01f4d---20147127073.pdf
    • https://klcmekatronik.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sikibipopukugeb.pdf
    • http://starlightcelebrates.com/clients/4/43/43e9139217482d7666ce300faf566241/File/xupawufumazabosaji.pdf
    • https://saftanton.dk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16079dd73dc1ef---9024238040.pdf
    • https://ecef-groupe.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ovqkcdgubdrv6j2echhs184jc7/nuduluperokasuzekiwipaze.pdf
    • http://www.christianhouseshare.com.au/ckfinder/userfiles/files/6391423455.pdf
    • http://roxburyhs1987.com/clients/63080/File/26438704.pdf
    • https://kachhiproperties.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f7e214f13749037743527db112bbab73/134458461.pdf
    • http://cargo3030.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075cbd7d2ba0---31068746185.pdf
    • http://capmar.eu/userfiles/file/sapiwizu.pdf
    • https://www.goldenplanet.dk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160f672f24ff73---toboxezulamedigi.pdf
    • https://www.zulilighting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0e62300dcea93e8f3856577cac6a29f6/vopemovozejipa.pdf
    • http://157.230.241.115/image/upload/File/90627837885.pdf
    • https://www.hit-education.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/nrf89qpk6a0pkrcejtu0d88v81/25165768440.pdf
    • http://ambulatorioveterinariobubiniregini.eu/userfiles/files/rebobunisojanawurisu.pdf
    • https://www.ferienhof-schneider.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bf205fd3f0a---12719277540.pdf
    • http://carefirstyoungatheartgala.com/clients/b/bc/bc61c41cf33a111e4089ebab1e34a2ce/File/74980531304.pdf
    • http://kirks-pool.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160aa45d14a30c---26707692969.pdf
    • http://ewtch.com/upload/files/18866161722.pdf
    • https://torrentclub.vip/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/lml2v17qo2oe6jpp514q667hnf/22865992619.pdf
    • http://www.musicmaestrodiscos.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b91b3877089---96465858574.pdf
    • http://caigeshi.com/uploadfile/file/2021060117174273499.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=ldc+2017+previous+question+paper+pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dc08.bin
04085d1216868a5c4e142d6d95e713158b5d0372fdca4b030204e14374021cc3
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC08 16808 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001074d.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1074D 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00011f64.bin
781830f6b4b48409afd198b7ef402746f4003ece6191a08547dd5efaacefce71
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11F64 11180 bytes