Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0fabf6678522ecda…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

262.0 KB Created: 2020-12-03 09:47:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: cfb27802ed4deaa784e14c74ae9ee366 SHA-1: 9c2d7797d727e4c5dfd1433b6bc796bffb7d5912 SHA-256: 0fabf6678522ecdae223fd6bae747ca2bd574082e4638e113c6b160f9da72be3
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1129 Execution through API

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. This object is identified as a risky file type that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically a JAR file. The presence of this embedded object strongly suggests an attempt to deliver and execute a secondary stage malware payload upon opening the document.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
9986358e07403902b4964d576e16b9c5ed23ac2b7b5a7e1fb3cfa17390150e90		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 254976 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.98, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
957da89155e3f36932a0bf81a6148e203d9f45b6823cf8e055101f9a023a041f		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 250672 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
5850d8ff6675548947eea2ab0f20eba1eb48a70cf53ae9c6403505ee13794bf2		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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