Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0f87271f442528f2…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

32.2 KB First seen: 2023-01-10
MD5: 155e4d6d2481e2e2fa2947bbb0cf1a73 SHA-1: cc1e9b7f845116548045c17b455b33bcd36229e9 SHA-256: 0f87271f442528f2631a92b0cf0d1f37e145f5cfc0c6c29bb5a6042657f14878
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID, which is a known exploit vector. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document body includes a lure to 'Enable editing' to view or edit the document, indicating an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities upon user interaction. No specific malware family is identifiable from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004dff.bin
720d0847b667ad6f4596a04a19ac1388aec8b5785362cb158669a61d0ada1b20
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4DFF 1444 bytes