Emotet — Office (OOXML) / .XLSX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0f775d3d31850743…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

115.1 KB Created: 2015-06-05 18:17:20 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 12.0000
MD5: 0b961a55cb95c13b68600fd6628bb621 SHA-1: 3a04f8d3ecd9b29f4f9a1f7052d29351bb4f1fe2 SHA-256: 0f775d3d31850743aebaa5b755d3d7fa33de3318dee63de5547e47ea515a2656
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample contains a Workbook_Open VBA macro that executes obfuscated PowerShell commands. These commands are designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from multiple URLs. The presence of a Workbook_Open macro and the nature of the PowerShell execution strongly indicate the Emotet family, which commonly uses this technique for initial payload delivery.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.EmotetExcel02223-9938902-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.EmotetExcel02223-9938902-0
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
df1eb14c222394595c0518b49eec2b55ed9573146c5f1717dedceddd2e199a2b
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 12041 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
b4e77782eb09700e14845b82afe40beb12d38b2421eb530495d5079a470b2500
vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 42496 bytes