Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 7

• Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
  RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
• Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
  RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
• Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
  RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
• \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
  RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
• Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
  RTF contains ~4670KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
• OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
  RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
• Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

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