Emotet Office (OLE) / .DOCX malware analysis — malicious · 0f6ae41a1f491a12

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

162.6 KB Created: 2020-09-15 22:30:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word

MD5: f2092d1060d3b75f9183624dbe8d8b85 SHA-1: 60de68567a140fc39a0db6e860c584767cff25b4 SHA-256: 0f6ae41a1f491a1221c5f659d1e07bcd6fd77d7098b37873226a9bca27649ce5

262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a Microsoft Word document containing VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro that utilizes CreateObject to execute a PowerShell stager. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.Emotet-9762299-0' strongly suggests the Emotet family. The obfuscated PowerShell command within the VBA macro is designed to download and execute a subsequent payload, a common tactic for Emotet.

Heuristics 7

Hidden UserForm PowerShell EncodedCommand stager critical OLE_USERFORM_OBFUSCATED_POWERSHELL

OLE document contains a UTF-16LE form/property string with an obfuscated PowerShell -EncodedCommand payload. The observed macro family reconstructs this hidden string with Split/Join or UserForm property reads and launches it through WMI/COM process creation. This is downloader malware, not an Office CVE exploit.
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-9762299-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-9762299-0
Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN

Document_Open macro
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `552d784ab69156220ac353b18611d326284a0fac1bed1acb2f14ae222ef14256`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	25576 bytes

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