Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0f5b009498b79077…

MALICIOUS

PDF

12.0 KB Created: 2009-11-22 19:44:47 Authoring application: PDF Library 9.1.10 (via PDF Library 5.1.2)
MD5: 39733b85a06d0dbb0f9cd69d798dd080 SHA-1: f0f601544f0195e5824b09d4863118dd2683f44a SHA-256: 0f5b009498b79077dcfe08a40edf9609fdd92c2d009d8f47fa5b927ddeb507ec
470 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF exploits known vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader, specifically CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, and CVE-2008-2992, through embedded and obfuscated JavaScript. The deobfuscated JavaScript contains shellcode that attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload from the provided URLs. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • ASCIIHexDecode filter (with exploit indicators) medium PDF_FILTER_HEX
    Hex-encoding filter present alongside exploit delivery indicators — often used to hide payload or shellcode bytes
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://msnssd.com/www/cmvw2.exe
    • http://msnssd.com/www/click.php?r=
    • http://msnssd.com/www/mrdz2.exe
    • http://msnssd.com/www/dfjmnq2.exe

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0007_000.js
9c5a09d16385ee8efee11c75b442924789c5a84d7040756c8d9f8ea7abf7e664		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x268 37603 bytes
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
20af10b74e2fece5b96af1432203de38680e1610a8933b1cec3f74e2c2f36bf2		 deobfuscated-js numeric array subtract-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x268 9874 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.