Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0f51597edfdce831…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.0 KB Created: 2021-02-24 13:00:49 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-21
MD5: bc438717b3a1c9822105ebd8e6725f50 SHA-1: 90cf3a44b2580db2d255adab31b6d96d079def18 SHA-256: 0f51597edfdce831baf4fae026ef769533ba48532c3f86025033a9857f9648a6
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs point towards an attempt to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jacksth.ru/strik?utm_term=what+is+difference+between+record+date+and+ex+dividend+date PDF link annotation
    • https://nukivobiwej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134016752/d11f32413f361.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://foziwumiwogesis.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135321673/1096d8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jabosuve/ibherwl/74366169370.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/disonixures/LjbQgij/xuvikofejupanemiwebati.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/niripakexad/hd2chbT/52331375156.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kupawusel/jix5Agj/tezepatamavuko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xewafazuk/fBihdus/popurig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kimejijomaki/WmRghhd/wozowinur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xenotami/OhdjcYg/telututonelumusukafabapa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://nulanajivokavos.rf.gd/bulolivipi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tarizirefevifab/cad_2d_design_free.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wogurep.epizy.com/biketotadofe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jebokizez/97153398912.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://desatekanexoz.rf.gd/72066236718.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://noxoposuxasife.rf.gd/repairing_sheetrock_inside_corners.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dc32.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC32 5236 bytes
SHA-256: 00688495a5deaf06f3640fd2ecd5e6db37849c7a9f85886032bd9f92cbf2e8ab
font_01_sfnt_off0000ee09.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE09 10092 bytes
SHA-256: e29f0313e533bd00aaa19115b41b8f732ecd7dd2a5986da09002395f68292174
font_02_sfnt_off000110a8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x110A8 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 4fcfa7c68d76e23b667942a3ac892d2d5d88346478daafc61479ad4df4af3dd3

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