Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0f3eabfd5a54bfcf…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

140.3 KB Created: 2021-01-27 17:21:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 79b40c256c6eb5d4f101d362e8624389 SHA-1: 2f887e9942dc567cd70377f979bf1556b19ccedc SHA-256: 0f3eabfd5a54bfcf9c2de21afcfc8c9c735577855785eed22714dbe0799ce009
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros. The Document_Open macro triggers the execution of other VBA functions, including one that constructs a URL and downloads a file. The script attempts to download a file using HTTP and save it to disk, indicating it acts as a downloader for a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12211-9918950-0' further supports this assessment.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12211-9918950-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12211-9918950-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
52a1fe8d1f44372134b47575f5a15cb6b0e178b406c4c0063800db4c135dbb60		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2265 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
b1a8c9207b9e5797be45ab96cc5549737b032f62ad3b1ed64cdd12d76eeb7cf2		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 114176 bytes

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