Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0f3240987daaa823…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.76 MB Created: 2025-09-16 18:10:00 First seen: 2026-02-26
MD5: a6d4be5c1059873073b1192a29a46c80 SHA-1: 20114fe914439cf5d65feb54b98c611f646ee364 SHA-256: 0f3240987daaa8234cf12ffb5c9c023e9cbb67036a04bd3c161e3ccf34fb251c
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple critical heuristic firings indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-8759, which are known vulnerabilities allowing for remote code execution. The presence of an embedded OLE object and a hidden package further supports this. The document body appears to be a benign project tracking template, suggesting the malicious functionality is hidden within the exploited objects. One unknown reputation URL was extracted, which could be a download source for a secondary payload.

Heuristics 8

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • CVE-2026-21514 — Word/OLE security bypass in RTF high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    RTF contains a hidden \svb hex package with DrsE2oDoc and downRevStg drawing compatibility parts. This matches an observed CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape that manipulates Word's internal document structure and trust decisions.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.sunamien.jp/cgi/up/uploader.cgi?mode=downld&no=60
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml
    • https://support.office.com/en-us/article/welcome-to-microsoft-teams-free-6d79a648-6913-4696-9237-ed13de64ae3c
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/infopath/2007/PartnerControls
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/contentType
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties/metaAttributes
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/documentManagement/types
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/metadata/core-properties
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://purl.org/dc/terms/
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/internal/obd
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dc.xsd
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dcterms.xsd
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/v3/contenttype/forms
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/cus�

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000af79f.bin
4d85321b546d999958789e8c197eb1bc62d145b2e284993669eb2d80a118c9a5		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAF79F 13907 bytes
objdata_01_off000c1ba1.bin
84d47208057ac323bbd82f9bcfcc19d412ab8201f50ce8c41bf02dc7e9f53faa		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC1BA1 584826 bytes
rtf_svb_00000009.zip
28fc295dafc0bcccd998d6dc34a4e9ae47eb34cb74cb4b892eb6454833467799		 rtf-svb-package RTF \svb hex-decoded ZIP at offset 0x9 116932 bytes

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