RTF malware analysis — malicious · 0f1fe0104290313a

MALICIOUS

RTF

2.24 MB Created: 2024-04-03 08:46:00 First seen: 2025-07-29

MD5: f8d147f8786b5cbae72a23f8ce19cedb SHA-1: 2b90d5f623306705aad6d8f21ad5a9001eb337d4 SHA-256: 0f1fe0104290313a63dd327a07140f1c528e99b4889115b7adc2cac95b8bf7a6

202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model and Distributed Component Object Model

The RTF file contains critical heuristic firings indicating the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 through an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. The ".objupdate" heuristic suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to arbitrary code execution. No document body text or scripts were extracted, but the presence of the CVE-2017-11882 exploit is sufficient evidence of malicious intent.

Heuristics 6

CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882

Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00003a12.bin` `8583b382331247f5bd0d35330611d87de32483e0b12c2e92b36c1880e9faf3d6`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12	88398 bytes
`objdata_01_off00039d01.bin` `9e8b68393d57d3e633893d134c107c3da58d6e56a7e72494dca54b9ee885b5f4`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x39D01	584266 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.