Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0f1dece74e715471…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.3 KB Created: 2020-08-03 04:03:02 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 03aeb40bdc92d7d10f0919dfca969bb3 SHA-1: fea7a7ab1327c98321dde2d26d8a9b20429623c8 SHA-256: 0f1dece74e71547144d6f37336c132813ba731a01c82706e675b80204a80dfee
254 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a critical heuristic firing for linking to known malicious redirector infrastructure, specifically 'https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=protonmail+vs+tutanota'. It also exhibits characteristics of a link farm, with numerous embedded URLs pointing to external PDF files. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the same malicious URL and several benign-looking Shopify URLs, suggesting a lure to external content. The heuristic 'SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE' indicates the document may also attempt to solicit sensitive information, further supporting a phishing or scam attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE
    Document requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=protonmail+vs+tutanota
    • http://files.placentaedmonton.ca/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776407/7938266.pdf
    • http://files.1songproductions.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775245/d8d443561a1.pdf
    • http://files.theadventureawaits.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775953/3651408.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0097/8853/files/56205623830.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5709/4559/files/toside.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6997/2383/files/97414032724.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9803/8679/files/zufodusavezibedu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/0781/9422/files/87005257291.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/xiguxalenagidofivixonagez.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/1701/1353/files/wokopepokipobikapasiz.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/0581/2629/files/wokolaxug.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/4557/6088/files/digawurebusiroluduteb.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/9749/6477/files/wanizirabadotemewuxa.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5712/7336/files/61454847538.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/7526/4924/files/97355886548.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007fb3.bin
b6f8d91f2486354fbc5036a9104a4316bcccfce97a84e163744d4e5403f72b6e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7FB3 4656 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008f54.bin
b8aed720c0af63f4a0820c2f3b6f4266d64bf4d9318bd0963bbe9c1a82461574		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8F54 10260 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000b25a.bin
7f6049e5011acf0e8581793f2bc2bb947aac2929fdb77abc318b2a6155c1ef71		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB25A 4324 bytes

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