Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0ec9c181dd7c828d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.21 MB
MD5: 9f06f63f9a90dd4c0d97462c83878d7b SHA-1: 7820c726bb3c60b6f31afc41a8e0c8b4c8d04690 SHA-256: 0ec9c181dd7c828dd1b38f773f7f0d1adea03f67890c424aa83e2f9aa1b5b1c6
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability through the Equation Editor. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics strongly indicates this attack vector.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
ae25add9ea57110f4305079e154f3ddcbe4c50275b5770f553524426b1a93972
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 27212 bytes
objdata_01_off0001ca59.bin
1a9daf7f5259077ae9a7fba5e35fb7f5d70b6d43574b5a4ed8dc4e9c9ad184d1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1CA59 475057 bytes