Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Heuristics 7

• Embedded Office object carries macros critical OFFICE_EMBEDDED_MACRO_OBJECT
  This document embeds a second Office file that itself contains a VBA macro project or an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet. Hiding a macro-bearing workbook or document inside another document — frequently under an obfuscated, non-standard part name — is a macro-smuggling technique that defeats scanners which only inspect the outer document's macro storage. No benign authoring workflow stages a hidden macro project this way.
• VBA project inside OOXML medium 1 related finding OOXML_VBA
  Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
• VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
  Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
• Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
  Document contains an embedded OLE object
• Large OOXML part skipped info SCAN_INCOMPLETE
  One or more high-value OOXML parts exceeded the scanner's per-entry size cap and may not have been fully inspected.
• Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
  An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL https://elarchivodelaesperanza.com/Loader_v2_11cr0.exe In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

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