Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0e8c1d06a666b8af…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.4 KB
MD5: 85b320c19919ba2023f4498de055070d SHA-1: 475b545300a0d8e852bb5f5a8ac81bd69203834c SHA-256: 0e8c1d06a666b8afd7943b2df8f2367744d6d07450da94f1403f51ce1b67b02e
516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the exportDataObject function to launch cmd.exe. This command execution is further chained with a CVE-2010-1240 exploit, targeting the launch action to execute cmd.exe. The embedded payload is identified as a Windows executable disguised as a PDF, and ClamAV detected it as Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7. The presence of unknown URLs suggests potential command and control or payload delivery infrastructure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\template.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/
    • http://]hostname[:port]/path
    • http://www.apache.org/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
template.pdf
e8493cc4b0fd03ddbbcc72a8ba770252355a0a2557b775a9d664d928832d7f40
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x3B5 73802 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0009_000.js
bc1d5cdfa608238e3cd965aa51949d02f8ab713463ea0beb61ec928b121788d1
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0xB095 57 bytes