RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 0e74ec3531d6582f

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

558.4 KB

MD5: 69689a26ef9f1cebfa21c7a744bd8c54 SHA-1: c42b1888611ec6bd2334a38a141603daf71b29cc SHA-256: 0e74ec3531d6582f48b78688eaed07ef61f1da5a6a9fe0d00d724a098940c38e

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a ProgID associated with Equation Editor, specifically triggering heuristics related to CVE-2017-11882. This indicates the file is designed to exploit this vulnerability for client-side code execution. No document body text or scripts were extracted, limiting further analysis of the payload.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000052.bin` `23b1bb1896f3774ebd1481f1fd8a724059ecb71951717be9179b0275fc138850`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x52	285790 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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