Win.Trojan.Switcher-2 — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0e30eae85f579a1e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

25.5 KB Created: 1993-09-28 16:08:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word for Windows 95 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: db2be753eb0cb5cd81e6c36d0df8b980 SHA-1: 07928af37bac1e77e873be7123736819bddc38b9 SHA-256: 0e30eae85f579a1e1b84baca578b820110d9274d66140be7388da8d44abdaa36
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Win.Trojan.Switcher-2 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample exhibits characteristics of a legacy WordBasic macro virus, specifically the 'ToolsMacro' marker. Additionally, it contains an embedded OLE object with anomalous stream properties and a high child score, suggesting it's designed to deliver a secondary payload. ClamAV identifies this as Win.Trojan.Switcher-2, reinforcing the malicious classification.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Switcher-2 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Switcher-2
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUS
    OLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. OLE file is 21,405 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 21,405 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00001263.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x1263 21405 bytes
SHA-256: f64341751a3f11c10e5996aa3ef7af3393198445b31d9806e67673f750d9c198

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