Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0e2b8d54701880fd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

289.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-05-05
MD5: 348217ca00b8460c16205380d37ee65e SHA-1: 30c39e0fd9956bee8d4f5f87aff5452af897720b SHA-256: 0e2b8d54701880fd4f0bd27d6cd86b84cdc81dbb7c00054c2738d11ed0189147
112 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.005 Service Execution: Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that this OLE file is designed to exploit a vulnerability to download a remote document. The embedded URL, http://172.245.123.16/t/%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23.doc, is the likely source of the secondary payload. Although the VBA macros themselves do not contain executable statements, the file's structure and the CVE exploit suggest a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://172.245.123.16/t/%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23.doc

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00011400.pdf
850dfcf89f413a53892e0651b42c7192d676396b63a39834feaf394004468b22		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x11400 225792 bytes

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