Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0e2278517c0a64de…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

190.8 KB
MD5: 296381c5897f1b3d65d0bf087f0e2117 SHA-1: d306255b1a5faffd0dd1f26e0d3304f855365ab6 SHA-256: 0e2278517c0a64de6cd03d9ff5f3fabb125492f010332687a39561d4a6a56a36
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability through an Equation Editor object. This exploit allows for arbitrary code execution, indicating a malicious intent to compromise the user's system. The presence of the 'EQuation.3' ProgID is a strong indicator of this specific exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000b64.bin
4dd4d0bbda4cf621faf7a327f5b8687047467c19e270e09336ca6162e1f20417		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB64 1881 bytes

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