RTF malware analysis — malicious · 0e1e735a713ec9fe

MALICIOUS

RTF

102.7 KB First seen: 2024-08-22

MD5: 3d88ae1173dd6f3122d6936d7078982a SHA-1: 93fcf8892973b83230c4cd4a93afd7488a19b4c1 SHA-256: 0e1e735a713ec9fe401b65753fec786b84496d46e01c05a0193e70f6284a46a8

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data, specifically leveraging the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of RTF_OBJAUTLINK and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates that the embedded OLE object is designed to be automatically activated, likely to trigger the exploit. This exploit is known to download and execute a second-stage payload, hence the high confidence in this attack pattern.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000014ab.bin` `252512b8e296eb8e3ab6277bf8d307ab5bce4b9527e99ab2eb477e28eb36c9b9`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x14AB	2135 bytes

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