Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0e1c5c7469f69847…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.8 KB Created: 2021-02-01 09:49:07 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-31
MD5: 4e82ef9bf5b1e8e7f2ff82e3bc6645c2 SHA-1: d9b4c29627e7ab8df099ed6bafe0d144a3dceb01 SHA-256: 0e1c5c7469f69847c54e923da781e0f1a7dd9898a6f7903f6dd811567d442fa1
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many pointing to other PDF files, indicating a link farm or distribution mechanism. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were directly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external URLs are indicative of a malicious campaign, possibly involving spearphishing.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jottigo.ru/123?utm_term=canelo+vs+cotto+streams PDF link annotation
    • http://zosujobitusup.iblogger.org/95550024192.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fitokaps.xyz/secrets_of_the_wonderlic_test_study_guidewcxc6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xudogiborijum.66ghz.com/come_all_ye_pining_sheet_music.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fudesatalaponu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710537/7833452.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4392661/normal_5ff8bc201eb1b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4489732/normal_5fda3bd297723.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gaxatibixowoki.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452935/4654333.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fupodiruza.66ghz.com/auriculoterapia_francesa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mafaredoli.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695491/zofowijavivofik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372373/normal_600db71994f9f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lurufabufukigo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407807/4496706.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bawosizegidaw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131411147/zujekorizut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://tavarifa.epizy.com/zesawefijegosiwosefojit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e082.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE082 4768 bytes
SHA-256: c4db160913da23b831ba074cad3eff370cbe7cbf9c3ff81c6236c88b302aa0c5
font_01_sfnt_off0000f09c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF09C 10476 bytes
SHA-256: bc2b91b58fd5cbcd628928ff28f10c69fb0bcf74ae8e8097932b734798d67b6e
font_02_sfnt_off00011482.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11482 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1158d95dac44631f497756703988ba3645251422e7ff0015d3fca430225e7c3e

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