Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0e0bd7c06a523fda…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

28.5 KB First seen: 2022-11-16
MD5: be8a97f0f688cf64d82b772a21cca285 SHA-1: b63c772d4ac2075a2c476a7cf1cd0f432b16c7bf SHA-256: 0e0bd7c06a523fdab3d5652fba564d854cb741e8ca2b87e932b6e02755c304d3
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a ProgID indicative of the Equation Editor, a known vector for exploits. The \objupdate directive forces activation of this object upon opening, and the document body contains a lure to enable editing. This combination strongly suggests an attempt to exploit a vulnerability, likely CVE-2017-11882, to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000051e7.bin
ec7e1403fd593e37c3d892f3111f06279b718e8c2dc2cf357c40696a418be078
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x51E7 1801 bytes