Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0dfdccfb4e7bf774…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.7 KB
MD5: fc5fa5be8b1209979574fb49bbd34b6d SHA-1: 61f7342670cff31d0d5f933cca263fe68db7ef98 SHA-256: 0dfdccfb4e7bf774a178057ed203d8e7c3ad18db62bfed65078d8881b8fd2d87
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to Microsoft Equation Editor. Heuristics indicate the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882, which allows for arbitrary code execution when the embedded object is activated. This suggests the file is designed to exploit this vulnerability to achieve initial code execution on the victim's machine.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000087.bin
d01e156f0ecee5c9251071a20573ccd8bc1bdae786fec85ea1836f721f423109
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x87 2204 bytes