RTF malware analysis — malicious · 0df947fb97839a1a

MALICIOUS

RTF

83.4 KB First seen: 2024-08-27

MD5: 61b061a48eb132e15884e4b53cf0401f SHA-1: 0a8dfe6c53dd529299be6596b4fd0dad2e7aadc0 SHA-256: 0df947fb97839a1ad407667df1c19b277db26fde3954e6109ce70202102184d3

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

The sample is an RTF document containing an OLE object that exploits the Equation Editor vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to deliver secondary payloads. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, RTF_OBJUPDATE, and RTF_OBJDATA heuristics strongly indicates exploitation for client execution, likely leading to a download and execution of a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001800.bin` `49fe0307bf09400505507cbf9fab485928c406b0b9e05da285f192239e515107`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1800	1703 bytes

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