Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0ddcc9c5f8116cb8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

207.9 KB Created: 2010-01-25 11:26:39 +01:00 Authoring application: 376377000P000D000F000C000r000e000a000t000o000r000 000V000e000r000s000i000o000n000 0000000.0009000.0008 (via GPL Ghostscript 8.64)
MD5: f9e06ecf0642214ab752f6ac4c1d4f6c SHA-1: de2dbdf5c99e79e3b341547ad532560bb09299f3 SHA-256: 0ddcc9c5f8116cb80b94cc109535610b27a37251fd9d2df9a6266fca6a83a49c
516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the `exportDataObject` function to launch an embedded executable disguised as 'podwale3.pdf'. This executable is detected by ClamAV as 'Win.Trojan.ShellcodeReverseTcp-1'. The PDF itself is also flagged by ClamAV as 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-22444' and exhibits critical heuristic firings related to launch actions and embedded PE payloads, indicating exploitation of CVE-2010-1240.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\podwale3.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-22444 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-22444
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
podwale3.pdf
e383ce367bfaec54fc2878dee079b39a63c082227a7849fbcf51a7acff982400		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 66 at offset 0x2EED9 37888 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.ShellcodeReverseTcp-1
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0067_000.js
741f1843d45a284f6a2484c12e8b15512f0ff895574511a12676f2e3a7e0cbf2		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 67 at offset 0x33B92 57 bytes
stream_027_off0002492a.bin
778b3875c58f598eeeed85029e162969cc625c89e99c3767a7c366ce89f889c2		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x2492A 42600 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0002a871.bin
35ac1ffdd2635fc06c757ccc3fbfaf770544aaa0a757967f6ee26189b899e098		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2A871 26876 bytes

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