Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0db4c7f4cab26565…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

15.0 KB Created: 2021-07-16 10:28:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: b8fdc664398c6b3644d107330acf8cf8 SHA-1: c764dbc2505be7e94e508f99f532124571d8f4ed SHA-256: 0db4c7f4cab26565b3f41c829bffc239b31d4de63d39899bde824cd814fdfbfc
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro that automatically executes upon opening the document. This macro, named Document_Open, calls another subroutine that constructs and executes a PowerShell command. The constructed command is 'powershell.exe -nop -Windowsstyle hidden -Command- ', which is designed to run PowerShell in a hidden window and likely download and execute a further payload. This indicates a macro-based downloader attack.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
09f9fa7965209749dbc18e702f3ff7bc991899a8c9427d439d6eb5f13219edb7		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 525 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
3cfd9fe2c38c72b55db3a9fe8b677cf82f77de1735299b1e82a211fdf6d714f1		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 8192 bytes

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