Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0da7dc34501d3377…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

33.1 KB Created: 2021-08-21 00:23:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: ece45314257af3897d0fef2ce602b7c2 SHA-1: 6b957e40160537094d4005843e494f8843917975 SHA-256: 0da7dc34501d33778db66020fa29078fc2b849d1443abde3c1edc49588118ab4
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1003 OS Credential Dumping

The sample is an OOXML document containing VBA macros, including an AutoOpen macro, which is a common technique for malicious documents. The VBA code references PowerShell and appears to be designed to dump process memory using Windows API calls, indicating a potential credential dumping or information-gathering objective. No external network activity or specific payload delivery was directly observed in the provided evidence.

Heuristics 6

  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
6162eb378b821b60709a0f4298799e3b09b25f10e853fb2bfe70099d5d34586f		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 25320 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
d979a49c1d957ce7998abd8ff596a0b0de04cde5b2e5a9374fc52888aa277e4f		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 74752 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).

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