Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0d91a9e28758f75f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.6 KB
MD5: e355c0635c1132019839be4350bcafe8 SHA-1: 1b3ce458612d2ec0ec7af68b046843611db94299 SHA-256: 0d91a9e28758f75fda2ad7cf30d27581450e88684b0aabe791f547c848f85721
116 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a PDF file identified as malicious by an ML classifier and heuristics. It exploits CVE-2010-0188, a known vulnerability in Adobe Reader related to XFA forms. This exploit likely allows for the execution of arbitrary code, which is often used to download and run additional malicious content. No specific family could be identified, but the exploit vector is clear.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream low PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
7e36ccdc45a48879cb3de11b2d3e02340857cfecba73a7813623d8f7aea7ae62
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101221 bytes