Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0d6fc3ef9aa428f4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

88.2 KB Created: 2021-05-01 01:53:11 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: 4b721fcb973415046fd92bc6e77c66e7 SHA-1: bcfde65744b3f2f955af3a7674dd05907896d6ee SHA-256: 0d6fc3ef9aa428f4fac70baed2931497df0bfb31363ac259ff595354bc3f8da9
116 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs pointing to compromised WordPress sites, indicating a link farm designed to distribute malicious files. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, and heuristics identified it as a link farm on disposable hosting. The document body is heavily obfuscated, preventing a clear understanding of its specific lure, but the overall pattern suggests an attempt to trick users into downloading further malware.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://markzone.az/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/tqp45nf94sfedjitmg5ju9gt6t/39619919240.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://pinotcar.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/41b9fdf1c5ad8a069efa0f7109993d26/40938897090.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sip7.pl/autoinstalator/sip7.online/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/45749aefcd6e5d2ea941375ad5986c74/pufuvavoped.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://noks.cz/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f9d8dba8bc---39510827291.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://limpiasol.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d6d3f98dd7---17309224050.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.marthatrotts.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608b65de681e1---sesikexerumedep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.heainc.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608c53b34b78d---borogizaporu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sazjah.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16079dcf0a1ebb---17491339296.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.afamaresme.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607592ab3579b---nifaxomoxufosije.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://stellabakingcompany.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b772916233---38429728152.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thunderstar.cn/userfiles/file/20210430144611982192741.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mediabandit.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160777bb7eb992---47259600408.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://projectbudapest.hu/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608af0972ba51---didupevaben.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.dishdivvy.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/04870e223ab32bb00f42a61bf5e01120/zelunugaxifulomom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kalatranslation.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/lk61kq41tlbl02006vrg38k8jb/78180561814.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.davidcosz.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dleo2n00pfclm0s3d4lejosj0m/kedapinagonusezin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/YTWXjIUwRh0/uplcv?utm_term=arcsoft+totalmedia+3.+5PDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010326.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10326 4904 bytes
SHA-256: 7362496e24425b802c9470a15b2e43308243cec7f55f99913c4340305c46b742
font_01_sfnt_off0001143c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1143C 5476 bytes
SHA-256: 103a509c463129ff2376dcf16876a2f1c48cff40ed431261c9289f1d045212f7
font_02_sfnt_off000126cd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x126CD 14048 bytes
SHA-256: 0d467b131505b13f183a1157e9e1b83bc4f9cb4990c08397038bf12e23c3fe21

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