Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0d56b2ce745636b3…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.6 KB First seen: 2023-10-16
MD5: 3750d7541072df5f9b0ee1795110c911 SHA-1: d6c1d55716583f7b34d9c255256dcd0b77fa5562 SHA-256: 0d56b2ce745636b3e0cc692c8b44331795ef22751d376798d35f02ea512f6fe3
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as a vulnerable Equation Editor component. The presence of \objupdate indicates an attempt to force OLE activation, which is a common technique for exploiting Equation Editor vulnerabilities to achieve arbitrary code execution. The file's SHA256 hash is included as an IOC.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000008d.bin
8fc9ade904d28d718169b576d1ece70990d3e5ff6f77cee4481579c66cabd88c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x8D 1746 bytes