Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0d4e18520bbc8001…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.06 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-02-13
MD5: 64ddbe59c47c359bf4913efbdcf51a76 SHA-1: 4bcf1ef7fc968c362e668a4e77c82da9dc1f6047 SHA-256: 0d4e18520bbc8001264d8c40ee65ee9fbd03b385a42feed95e040b74c04644fb
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor object, which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the object is loaded. The VBA project itself contains no executable statements, indicating the malicious payload is likely within the OLE object.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
c390a9602ef515129cb80302b55b47826950e8650d796ddcec95b039882c4be8
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00DC805C/olE10NAtIVe 1656 bytes