Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0d389d30aba75aea…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.2 KB Created: 2021-05-21 07:58:30 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f3ecc5e06f9a428330ba021d33eb2a0e SHA-1: 823a91c4305ab598210968860b9d60c5e606631b SHA-256: 0d389d30aba75aea63f46ee5376456fd74bf2576178e15fd3bc1a6e5b9051665
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a link farm pointing to compromised WordPress sites, likely intended to host malicious payloads. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the structure suggests a lure document designed to trick users into downloading further malware. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF's structure and embedded links are indicative of a malicious distribution campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://pulsrmedia.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608df981d1366---81537258231.pdf
    • http://www.alwaysflorida.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607509a75c849---togekigipa.pdf
    • https://www.harasportcenter.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/kbi1cn6pfib3j4tpsi63g7tn5l/84878582652.pdf
    • https://www.eziblank.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0puc83b1s30oifh3takumjkpb0/48400311949.pdf
    • https://alphacleanwashing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bb26442666f561f129c7b4da96448b36/57660590252.pdf
    • http://www.nuricomuvakfi.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/18dp9v7444mpjv5l2pf87cn286/zuwoju.pdf
    • http://ovartec.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a574d454d6e---kovojirekejevotazobosomu.pdf
    • http://www.mondzorgvesa-voorschoten.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608d1735e8768---3052264538.pdf
    • https://jamiatulbanat.in/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160908e223eb6f---67143274845.pdf
    • http://xn--80aafkqcanfpgnhbng3b5i9a.xn--p1ai/pict/file/foxavuzijituzuripogakiva.pdf
    • http://constructionone.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16070332dd9d6f---bopito.pdf
    • https://transcendenceit.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b81431b98b3aaf311fd4472aff7a4d99/vezadunisupagaxudadowo.pdf
    • https://wacee.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160803edd0ee14---tabikesorimonu.pdf
    • https://beautifullifeuk.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a13ddd9dee026d889181a6941227556e/gakesemod.pdf
    • https://atlanthealth.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bfd5b9320e42ab3baad7f85318680cf6/talan.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/A3Ryygt5BCM/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+put+your+lg+top+load+washer+in+to+self+test+mode%252F+diagnostic+mode
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dc39.bin
d73309bf2be24d3cc051f94d96707cb1a0152031304310fa8ed1a7ed277f103e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC39 5760 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000efc4.bin
6eb6df4b951fb163916a89710a5269d939b04678d51c620b431b7294697a1c67		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEFC4 11792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001176a.bin
71fec8a3adfe41455811528c654ef740a0d97889ddd19e39e153b04b7507b7f0		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1176A 16160 bytes

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