Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0d3613b7a4aec3b9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

183.6 KB Created: 2022-05-22 17:25:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2022-05-24
MD5: e3269bf05703bb2d4e7cfcceca146ed5 SHA-1: e5e2a9a4c2dca94eb93669ef73219cfc7754a260 SHA-256: 0d3613b7a4aec3b9ad6f0fc308bdf7da98a4574e6cae6ab91a8c0ea4857f1fbc
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object that carries a VBA macro. This macro is configured to download a payload from the URL https://www.mediafire.com/file/frjrn9astpfr2ua/1.htm/file. The presence of the embedded macro and the external download URL strongly indicate a spearphishing attachment attack pattern.

Heuristics 3

  • Embedded Office object carries macros critical OFFICE_EMBEDDED_MACRO_OBJECT
    This document embeds a second Office file that itself contains a VBA macro project or an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet. Hiding a macro-bearing workbook or document inside another document — frequently under an obfuscated, non-standard part name — is a macro-smuggling technique that defeats scanners which only inspect the outer document's macro storage. No benign authoring workflow stages a hidden macro project this way.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.mediafire.com/file/frjrn9astpfr2ua/1.htm/file
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
1978b43bb7d3f4ea7e0544dc9270ed3e5ac68a498c567128e5a55c6f392832c8
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/!!!~!!!!!!!~~!!!!3.!!!~!!!!~!!~~!!!! 14378 bytes