PDF malware analysis — malicious · 0d353d2293797603

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.7 KB Created: 2020-10-02 03:19:00 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-06-14

MD5: 9eef37e84eb878b69e93046b096f9f28 SHA-1: 5e924d33a0861781f8ed6565111fdf47db04b5b7 SHA-256: 0d353d2293797603c4fc874006fb1aa04211cb82b9a76ab2922114ed92d57990

124 Risk Score

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK

PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM

Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=kunci+gitar+lagu+bidadari+tak+bersayap In PDF document text
- https://site-1038985.mozfiles.com/files/1038985/13039537606.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://site-1038700.mozfiles.com/files/1038700/78092205527.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://site-1037253.mozfiles.com/files/1037253/64553842063.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://site-1038427.mozfiles.com/files/1038427/xemesanavaxojopotobamuvox.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://site-1039413.mozfiles.com/files/1039413/16161786956.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://site-1036665.mozfiles.com/files/1036665/rufutofas.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://site-1040794.mozfiles.com/files/1040794/kupekaleju.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://site-1037833.mozfiles.com/files/1037833/mezizoxim.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://site-1039847.mozfiles.com/files/1039847/wugitonoduzaxi.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/0334/7097/files/10532728500.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
- http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`font_00_sfnt_off00005539.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5539	5516 bytes
SHA-256: `ef44766700bc85ae19ef402acc8dc4c7da9628d8835855c637c80ca74ca2cba6`
`font_01_sfnt_off00006806.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6806	10956 bytes
SHA-256: `a68a01b72184f877d70d68936102b1853b8b5a6c3b2e16dc0f8b80eb69027566`

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