Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0d349580a288f002…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.5 KB Created: 2020-10-28 08:20:06 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-06-14
MD5: d88b130922a7275e77f8bde0730eca8c SHA-1: bd78736c55d11e1e01ac941b047c0f6c7ffcd63c SHA-256: 0d349580a288f002a15141f36fe1ab4cbbbd403dca4fcf34fd91ebd7854b3a69
204 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=war+plan+orange+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://vekejuritikoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857631/lumurefimuwav-nalexo-fewajugakeka-ributesila.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kusebedanosude.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163667/2953342.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zozilevijuni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383476/6692480.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://paguzijap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453408/34bb4969e43.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://falogumirej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134368081/9744844.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://naxedomabaxa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606472/1999724.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sebiwijojemobod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134097571/3e092fb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kizekusoviwo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453028/joxufi-nabuba-fumiwi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sifizebutu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814914/312c5f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xumabilere.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163638/jadosoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vixijusodu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776714/fuzolugafikadeza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mojipolizu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134318612/niwovenuwafivonig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jodotabamusunew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134402052/wuvovedopapene.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zulatikuwa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776211/36305a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1ee347a7-9452-4843-8474-e2d08136c28e/27291252928.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b5627c89-2992-4d5f-aa0f-c19a9241ebb3/82903785186.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/dbdf6184-aaef-439b-805d-9cfab96c37e2/sarah_jt_leroy_excerpt.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/78be40ff-ebbf-4784-b288-39d6ed2215d7/84653424898.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8179930e-0042-44d1-b73b-c01f84973ea9/11752003180.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2fde39a0-a319-4331-b272-e47bb8fba146/nasuwoserid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/038af23b-63cc-47e5-a487-345110609edf/25190821069.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6bf9c0bd-2b70-4020-88ee-1664e5656b17/sims_4_hair_cc_tumblr.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1351ef3e-aea0-4b7f-b026-450fadc344e2/gejopatexafebopevibade.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2f9b0bf1-4c13-430d-884b-336a35c054ef/57630930091.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007ee7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7EE7 5044 bytes
SHA-256: 6884f921e776993300cb144c6216e8ebb82a68fad2543faeda3d646dbc4a3bd6
font_01_sfnt_off00009026.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9026 10736 bytes
SHA-256: 02c585e401bfaa1fb1e6bc303ade4a04a96e1d94ac3d3d18cb31d953426f89ba